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Abstract
We investigate the interaction between cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁeld
entry in a multi-ﬁrm setting. It is shown that the net proﬁts of the acquirer may
decrease when the acquisition gives the acquirer a strong position in the product
market, relative to greenﬁeld entrants. The reason is that the price of the assets
increases more than the acquirer’s proﬁt, due to strategic interaction eﬀects in the
product market. The paper also provides an explanation why MNEs entering a new
market by acquisitions may make a lower proﬁt than MNEs entering greenﬁeld. A
greenﬁeld entrant faces the risk of not being able to successfully locate production
due to the lack of knowledge of characteristics of the local market. The bidding
competition between the MNEs for being successfully located in the market then
drives up the acquisition price to such a level that being a successful greenﬁeld
entrant is, ex post, more proﬁtable.
Keywords: Investment Liberalization, FDI, Mergers & Acquisitions.
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Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) can use two types of business strategies to conduct
foreign direct investment (FDI); they can either acquire (or merge with) a ﬁrm in the
host country or invest greenﬁeld, i.e. set up a new plant in the host country.
When will the MNEs prefer acquisitions to greenﬁeld investment? Several factors
have been argued to be important for explaining why MNEs prefer to grow via M&As
rather than through organic growth: the quest for strategic assets, such as brand names,
the possessions of local permits or distribution networks and patents. Moreover, when the
time to market is vital, the takeover of an existing ﬁrm with an established distribution
system is preferable to developing a new local distribution and marketing organization.1
All these motivations seem build on the fact that the acquirer gains a strong position
in the product market by its acquisition. In order to capture this aspect, the domestic
assets will be said to be strategically valuable when giving the acquirer a strong position
in the product market, relative to greenﬁeld entrants.
We present a model where we indeed show that a high strategic value of the domestic
assets is conducive to acquisitions. However, while acquisition entry is associated with
a high strategic value of the domestic assets, we also show that such acquisitions might
have low proﬁtability: the net proﬁts of the acquirer may decrease, the more strategically
valuable the domestic assets are. In the model, a domestic ﬁrm is initially located in
the domestic market in country H. There are also several MNEs located in the world
market. The domestic market will now be exposed to international competition. The
interaction takes place in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the MNEs might acquire the
domestic ﬁrm’s assets. In the second stage, MNEs have the option of investing greenﬁeld
in new assets in country H. Finally, in the third stage, ﬁrms compete in oligopoly fashion
in country H.
The result that the net proﬁts of the acquirer, i.e. the product market proﬁtn e t
1See World Investment Report (WIR) 2000 and its reference to diﬀerent studies of cross-border
M&As.
2of acquisition price, may decrease in the strategic value of the domestic assets seems
counterintuitive at ﬁrst sight, since the domestic ﬁrm’s assets are then more valuable to
the MNEs when acquired. However, this result is intuitive, when taking into account
how the level of strategic value of the domestic assets aﬀects the acquisition price. The
price of the assets is a non-acquiring MNE’s willingness to pay, which consist of two
proﬁt terms: the proﬁtf o rt h i sﬁrm if it would instead obtain the domestic ﬁrm’s assets
net of the proﬁt when not buying. It then follows that the ﬁrst proﬁt term increases to
exactly the same extent as that of the acquirer from an increase in the strategic value
of the domestic assets, and will thus oﬀ-set the acquirer’s proﬁt increase. Moreover, the
second proﬁt term will decrease, the more strategically valuable the domestic assets are,
since the non-acquirer will then face a stronger competitor in the product market. This
implies that the willingness to pay increases further for the non-acquirer. Consequently,
the acquisition price increases more than the acquirer’s product market proﬁt when the
domestic assets become more strategically valuable.
In the literature on MNEs2, it has also been argued that one of the main beneﬁts from
acquiring a local competitor instead of entering greenﬁeld is that the acquisition helps the
ﬁrm avoid risks due to lack of knowledge of the speciﬁc characteristics of the local market.
Moreover, there may be several MNEs competing to enter the market, all of which may
n o tb ea b l et om a k eap r o ﬁtable entry, thereby making greenﬁeld investment risky. By
entering by a M&A, an MNE avoids the risk of unsuccessful greenﬁeld entry. However,
we show that the “extra” value of avoiding this risk is competed away in the bidding
competition over the domestic (target) ﬁrm’s assets. The price of the domestic ﬁrm’s
assets will be determined such that the net proﬁt of the acquirer is the expected value
of being a successful greenﬁeld entrant with a certain probability and an unsuccessful
entrant with a certain probability. The bidding competition over being successfully
located in the market with certainty thus drives up the acquisition price to such a level
that being a greenﬁeld entrant ex post is more proﬁtable. We thus show that MNEs
entering a new market by M&As may make a lower proﬁt than MNEs entering greenﬁeld.
2See Caves (1996).
3The selling of the failing South Korean car-producer Daewoo in 2000, where FORD
acquired Daewoo in competition with Daimler-Chrysler and Hyundai and GM and FIAT,
provides an example of the insights this paper may oﬀer. According to Business Week
(January 2000), an acquisition of Daewoo would (i) provide the acquiring ﬁrm with
strategically valuable assets (instant command of 1/3 of the South Korean market, the
second largest market in Asia), and (ii) secure and facilitate large scale entry into the
Asian market.3 In this situation, FORD apparently paid a high price for the South
Korean ﬁrm as indicated by the following quote from the Economist (2000): Insiders
admit that FORD was willing to pay well over the odds for the South Korean company
because of the strength it would thereby acquire in Asia. FORD actually paid such a
high price that, in September 2000, it abandoned its bid for Daewoo, when the revealed
problems with Daewoo’s assets turned out to be worse than FORD had anticipated.
(Business Week October, 2000). The apparently low proﬁtability of FORD’s bid then
seems to stem from a combination of - on the one hand - a high acquisition price
triggered by bidding competition over strategically valuable assets and - on the other
hand - underestimating Daewoo’s debts and liabilities.4
The strategic motive for paying a high price for strategically important assets also
seems to have been important in the bidding competition over Banco do Estado de
Sao Paulo (Banespa), the seventh-largest bank in Brazil. In November 2000, Banco
Santander Central Hispanio (BSCH) won a controlling minority stake in Banespa, in
competition with several other large banks, including its Spanish rival Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA). According to Business Week (April 23, 2001): “It cost
an astronomical $3.55 billion, but it put BSCH back on top” (before BBVA - authors
comment). The assets of Banespa were considered strategically valuable, as indicated
3For FORD, the later motivation seemed very important as indicated by the following quote from
the Economist (2000), commenting on FORD’s vulnerable situation as a non-acquirer: there is nothing
left for Ford to acquire, leaving organic growth as its only hope.
4FORD oﬀered to pay $6.9 billion. To our knowledge the bids from the other bidders were not
revealed. However, recently GM paid $400m for a 57% stake in Daewoo. (Financial Times, October,
2001).
4by the following quote ”Anyone who can add Banespa to their existing structure will
take a gigantic leap forward,” says Elio Duarte, director of institutional relations at the
Brazilian subsidiary of Britain’s HSBC Holdings PLC, one of the nine banks qualiﬁed to
take part in the auction.” (Business Week, November 20, 2000). According to Business
Week (November 20, 2000), this means that ”...bidders will pay a premium not just to
get their hands on Banespa but also to stop rivals from doing so.”
The related theoretical literature on FDI and MNEs is surveyed in Markusen (1995).
This literature does not explicitly address the question of whether entry into a foreign
market is greenﬁeld or through the acquisition of assets already in the market, or both.
This issue is at focus in our study, however.5
There is also a small theoretical literature addressing aspects of cross-border mergers
in international oligopoly markets.6 However, the equilibrium acquisition price, which is
in focus in our study, is not determined in those studies.
The model is spelled out in Section 2. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium market
structure. Section 4 concludes. Finally, most proofs appear in the Appendix.
2. The Model
Consider a country H, where the market has previously been served by a single domestic
ﬁrm, denoted d, possessing one unit of domestic assets, denoted ¯ k. This market will
now be exposed to international competition.7 There are several diﬀerent reasons why
the market is exposed to international competition at this stage, but not previously.
For instance, the country might be investment liberalizing, the expansion might be a
natural step in the life cycle of a product8 or stem from increasing local demand, or
5See Görg (1997) and Das and Sengupta (2001) for papers addressing the choice of entry mode.
However, these papers abstract from the competition between MNEs, which is at focus in our study.
6This literature includes papers by, for example, Bjorvatn (2001), Head and Reis (1997) and Horn
and Persson (2001).
7It is of no consequence whether the market was previously open to imports.
8Caves (1996, p.58) argues that many MNEs cannot expand quickly due to constraints of growth.
For example, management skills must be developed.
5the administrative costs of cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁeld entry may have been
reduced in the globalization process.
We assume that there are M>1 symmetric MNEs in the world market. The MNEs
did initially not have any assets in Country H, but might now invest. The interaction
takes place in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the MNEs might acquire the domestic
ﬁrm’s assets. In the second stage, MNEs have the option to invest greenﬁe l di nn e w
assets in country H. Finally, in the third stage, ﬁrms compete in oligopoly fashion in
country H.9
The next sections describe the product market interaction, the greenﬁeld investment
game, and the acquisition game.
2.1. Stage three: product market interaction
The proﬁts in the industry will depend on the distribution of asset ownership. Due to
symmetry, we need only to distinguish between two types of ownership structures: (i)
the one where the domestic assets are sold to one of the MNEs, denoted km,a n d( i i )t h e
one where the domestic assets remain in the hands of the domestic owner, denoted kd.




m) ≡ (0,α¯ k,kG,k G,...,kG,       
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M−Nm−1




d) ≡ (¯ k,kG,k G,...,kG,       
Nd
0,...,0       
M−Nd
). (2.2)
The ﬁrst entry in each vector shows the asset ownership of the domestic ﬁrm, the second
entry is the asset ownership of the, potentially, acquiring MNE. The parameter α > 0
captures that an MNE and the domestic ﬁrm may diﬀer in how eﬃc i e n t l yt h e yc a nu s e
the assets ¯ k. We shall discuss the parameter α in detail below. The remaining entries
show the asset ownership of the non-acquiring MNEs, being either greenﬁeld entrants
9The choice of timing between the acquisition and the greenﬁeld investment is not obvious in a
general setting. In this particular application, however, it seems natural for the acquisition decision to
be made before the greenﬁeld decision, since the assets for sale already exist in the market and entering
greenﬁeld requires the construction of a new plant, which is usually time consuming.
6(having assets kG) or ”exporters”, i.e. non-investing MNEs (having assets kE ≡ 0).
Under MNE ownership, there is one acquiring MNE and Nm non-acquiring MNEs that
invest greenﬁeld, whereas M −Nm −1 MNEs do not invest. Under domestic ownership,
there are Nd MNEs investing greenﬁeld and M − Nd MNEs that do not.
Under MNE ownership of the domestic assets ¯ k,w el e tπA(km) denote the reduced-
form product market proﬁt for the acquiring MNE, πG(km) the corresponding proﬁtf o r
a non-acquiring MNE as a greenﬁeld entrant, and πE(km) the corresponding proﬁtf o ra
non-acquiring MNE as exporter (i.e. a non-investing MNE). Under domestic ownership
of the assets ¯ k, MNEs are either greenﬁeld entrants or exporters, with proﬁts πG(kd) and
πE(kd), respectively. The corresponding proﬁtf o rt h ed o m e s t i cﬁrm under the respective
ownership structures are πd(kl),l= {d,m}.
We make the following assumptions about proﬁts in the product market as summa-
rized by table 2.1:
Table 2.1: Basic assumptions.
Assumption
A1: πh(kl(·,Nl) > πh(kl(·,Nl +1 )
A2: πh(kl) > πE(kl) ≡ 0,h = {A,G}
πd(kd) > πd(km) ≡ 0
A3:

   











≡ 0,h = {d,G}
Assumption A1 states that the product market proﬁt for all types of ﬁrms decreases
in the number of greenﬁeld entrants, Nl. We describe greenﬁeld entry in detail in the
next section.
Assumption A2 states that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt increases in its own capital stock in country
7H. This assumption then forms the basic motive for FDI in terms of acquisition or
greenﬁeld entry, stemming from trade cost avoidance or lower factor costs. To facilitate
readability, but with no loss of generality, we normalize such that πE(kl) ≡ 0, i.e. export
proﬁts for MNEs, are set to zero.10 Moreover, we also assume that the domestic ﬁrm
will not make any product market proﬁt without its assets, πd(km)=0 .
The local assets ¯ k may be used diﬀerently under domestic and foreign ownership. As-
sumption 3 then states that an increase in the strategic value, α, increases the acquirer’s
proﬁt, whereas the market proﬁt for a non-acquirer (i.e. greenﬁeld investor) decreases.
T h es i z eo ft h e s ee ﬀects depends on the strength of complementarities between MNEs´
ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets and the domestic assets. For example, the combination of an MNE’s
strong brand name and the acquired ﬁrm´s knowledge of the market or strength in dis-
tribution may provide the acquiring MNE with a strong market position. If the brand
name of the domestic assets are locally very strong, the strategic value of the assets will
also be high. Or, if the domestic assets are sold at an early stage, the acquirer may gain a
strong ﬁrst-mover advantage, building up a dominant position in the product market.11
This set-up and these assumptions are compatible with several diﬀerent oligopoly
models. For example, Farell and Shapiro (1996) study changes in exogenous assets
ownership, assuming the product market competition to be Cournot. Under general
assumptions on demand and costs, they show that an increase in capital for a ﬁrm (i)
increases this ﬁrm’s proﬁt, while (ii) decreasing the proﬁts of its competitors. Since
kA = α¯ k,a ni n c r e a s ei nα corresponds to an increase in eﬀective asset ownership by the
acquiring MNE, the Farrell and Shapiro model (1996) is compatible with this set-up.
Moreover, using a quantity-setting conjectural variation oligopoly model under a set of
10It can shown that all results in this paper can be derived without this normalization, allowing for
the service or good produced by this industry to be either tradable or non-tradable.
11As a speciﬁc example, in the retail industry, MNEs acquire local retail chains and combine their
advantages of global sourcing with the advantages of the established distribution network. As Greenﬁeld
entry does not have this advantage, and it takes more time to build local assets, an acquiring MNE is at
an advantage. While having the initial possession over the distribution network, a domestic ﬁrm lacks
the advantage of global sourcing.
8stability criteria, Dixit (1986) shows that a change, which is prima facie favorable to a
ﬁrm, as is an increase in capital (α), reduces the proﬁts of all other ﬁrms.
2.2. Stage two: Greenﬁeld investments
At this stage, MNEs that did not enter the market through the acquisition of ﬁrm d,
can enter by undertaking a greenﬁeld investment at a ﬁxed cost, G.12 To simplify the
analysis, we assume that investments into greenﬁeld assets kG are ”lumpy”, i.e. they
come in discrete assets or plants and that the domestic ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to invest in this stage due to, for instance, ﬁnancial or managerial restrictions.
Assumption A2 states that there are locational advantages for MNEs from producing
in country H. We use two diﬀerent ways of determining the number of MNEs which take
advantage of such business opportunities by investing greenﬁeld, Nl:
(i) Greenﬁeld entry might be risky due to lack of knowledge of the speciﬁcc h a r a c t e r -
istics of the local market. In the literature on MNEs, it is argued that one of the main
beneﬁts of acquiring a local competitor instead of entering greenﬁeld is the avoidance of
such risks.13 To this end, we assume that there is an exogenous individual risk of failure
in greenﬁeld entry.14 We denote the probability of successful entry as Pl =P .N l is then
simply the MNEs drawn as successful in the greenﬁeld stage.
(ii) Alternatively, all MNEs may not face proﬁtable greenﬁeld entry due to insuﬃcient
demand. To determine the number of entrants in this case, we assume the pool of
potential entrants to be ordered in sequence, where each possible ordering can be drawn
with equal probability.15 Entry then takes place until the last ﬁrm cannot cover its entry
cost G,t h a ti s ,Nl must fulﬁll πG(kl(·,Nl) > G and πG(kl(·,Nl+1) ≤ G. The probability
12There is then implicitly assumed to be a minimum eﬃcient plant scale, which is not too small
relative to market demand.
13See Caves (1996).
14Consequently, we assume that there is no correlation between the probability of successful greenﬁeld
entry for diﬀerent MNEs.
15This follows the approach by, for instance, Vives (1988).







M−1 if l = m
Nd
M if l = d.
(2.3)
Note that in this case, an MNE’s probability of greenﬁeld entry may not be the same
under a diﬀerent ownership of the domestic assets: First, the number of MNEs competing
for greenﬁeld entry is diﬀerent. In addition, the number of proﬁtable greenﬁeld entrants
Nl may not be the same. This follows directly from Assumption A3, where it is assumed
that the product market proﬁts for greenﬁeld entrants diﬀer under diﬀerent ownerships
of the domestic assets.16
2.3. Stage one: the acquisition game
To focus on the bidding competition among MNEs as the determinant of the equilibrium
buyer, we assume that MNEs post bids for the domestic ﬁrm, which that ﬁrm may accept
or reject.17 More speciﬁcally, the acquisition process is depicted as an auction where M
MNEs simultaneously post bids and the domestic ﬁrm then either accepts or rejects these
bids.18 Each MNE i announces a bid, bi, for the domestic ﬁrm. b =( b1,b 2,...,bM) ∈ RM
16What is important for most of our results is that the expected proﬁtf o raﬁrm participating in
the greenﬁeld investment game is non-negative for all parameter values and positive for some. The
r e s u l t si nt h ep a p e rh o l di ft h ei n v e s t m e n tg a m ec a nb em o d e l e da ss i m u l t a n e o u sg a m ea n ds o l v e df o r
Nash equilibria in pure strategies, where each equilibrium is assumed to have equal probability. In a
general simultaneous entry approach, there might be over as well as underinvestment, however (Dixit
and Shapiro (1986)). Another approach is to include a pre-entry period, where ﬁrms can use irreversible
commitments to convert the game into a sequential one. Nti (2000) then shows that in such an approach,
the expected net proﬁt of participating in the investment game is positive.
17The main results of the paper would hold if there were initially more than one domestic ﬁrm in the
market. However, several other aspects would then have to be taken care of, such as the possibility of
domestic mergers, timing of the selling of the diﬀerent domestic ﬁrms, etc., and the analysis of these
issues is outside the scope of this paper.
18The main result in the acquisition game would also hold in a setting where the domestic ﬁrm states
an asking price simultaneously with the MNEs’ bids. There will be multiple equilibria, not present in
this set-up, for some parameter values in such a setting, however.
10is the vector of these bids. Following the announcement of b, the domestic ﬁrm may be
sold to one of the MNEs at the bid price or remain in the ownership of ﬁrm d.I fm o r e
than one bid is accepted, the bidder with the highest bid obtains the domestic assets. If
there is more than one MNE with such a bid, each such MNE obtains the assets with
equal probability. The acquisition is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure
strategies.19
It is assumed that ﬁrm d cannot make a bid for the MNEs. This assumption might
be motivated by the domestic owner being ﬁnancially weaker or lacking the competence
to eﬃciently run the larger business. Moreover, it is assumed that MNEs cannot make
bids on each other’s ﬁrms. This assumption might be supported in a full merger model
in two basic ways. One is to assume that the proﬁt of a merged entity is small enough
to imply that no merger takes place between the MNEs.20 The second possibility would
be to assume that mergers between MNEs would not be permitted by the competition
authorities.
We now turn to the ﬁrms’ valuations of the domestic ﬁrm’s assets ¯ k.T h e r ea r et h r e e
diﬀerent valuations which need to be considered:
vmimj is the value for MNE i of obtaining ¯ k,w h e nM N Ej would otherwise obtain ¯ k.
Using symmetry among MNEs, we will suppress the subindices and simply write vmm.
The ﬁrst term shows the proﬁtw h e np o s s e s s i n g¯ k. The second term is the expected





m) − G] (2.4)
vmd is the value for MNE i of obtaining ¯ k when the domestic ﬁrm would otherwise
keep them. The expected proﬁtf o rM N Ei when not obtaining assets ¯ k is diﬀerent in
19There is a smallest amount, ε, chosen such that all inequalities are preserved if ε is added or
subtracted.
20For instance, it has been shown by Kamien and Zang (1990) that the hold up problem in merger
formation might lead to no merger taking place in equilibrium, if the initial number of ﬁr m si ss u ﬃ-
ciently large. Moreover, mergers might be non proﬁtable since the costs associated with mergers can be
substantial, for example due to problems of melting together diﬀerent company cultures.
11this case, for two reasons. First, when the ¯ k assets are in the hands of the domestic ﬁrm,
they might be used diﬀerently from when in the hands of an MNE. This implies that the
proﬁts as a greenﬁeld entrant will typically be diﬀerent. Second, as previously discussed
in section 2.2, the probability of succeeding with greenﬁeld entry may also be aﬀected








vd is the value for the domestic ﬁrm of obtaining ¯ k. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,s i n c ew eh a v e
assumed that πd(km)=0 :
vd = πd(k
d). (2.6)
The ﬁrms’ bidding behavior is dependent on the relation between their own valuation
of obtaining assets ¯ k and all other ﬁrms’ valuations of obtaining these assets. Since
MNEs are symmetric, valuations vmm,v md and vd can be ordered in six diﬀerent ways,
as shown in table 2.2. As will be shown in the analysis below, these inequalities are
useful for illustrating the results.
Table 2.2: Orderings of valuations
Inequality Deﬁnition
I1: vmm >v md >v d
I2: vmm >v d >v md
I3: vmd >v mm >v d
I4: vmd >v d >v mm
I5: vd >v mm >v md
I6: vd >v md >v mm
123. The equilibrium ownership structure
We are now set to derive the equilibrium ownership structure (EOS), the acquisition
price, A, and the net proﬁt for each type of ﬁrm in the international oligopoly laid out
above. To this end, we need some further notation. As stated earlier, in equilibrium,
three types of ﬁrms can exist: (i) The net proﬁto ft h eM N Et h a th a sa c q u i r e dt h e¯ k
assets is denoted ΠA and consists of product market proﬁts net of the acquisition price,
i.e. ΠA(km)=πA(km) − A, (ii) MNEs that have invested greenﬁeld. ΠG denotes this
ﬁrm’s net proﬁt, i.e. ΠG(km)=πG(km)−G and ΠG(kd)=πG(kd)−G when the domestic
assets are under MNE and domestic ownership, respectively and (iii) the domestic ﬁrm.
Πd denotes the domestic ﬁrm’s net proﬁt, i.e. Πd(kd)=πd(kd),i fa s s e t s¯ k remain in d’s
ownership and Πd(km)=A otherwise.
We can then state the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium ownership structure (EOS), acquisition price and net proﬁt
for each type of ﬁrm are described in table 3.1:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Table 3.1: Equilibrium ownership, acquisition price and net proﬁts.
Inequality: I1,I 2, or I3 I4 I2,I 5, or I6
EOS: km km kd
A : vmm vd .
ΠA :P m [πG(km) − G] πA(km) − πd(kd) .
ΠG : πG(km) − G πG(km) − G πG(kd) − G
Πd : vmm vd πd(kd)
Lemma 1 shows that when one of the inequalities I1,I 3,o rI4 holds, ¯ k is obtained
by one of the MNEs. Under I1 and I3, the acquiring MNE pays the acquisition price
13A = vmm,a n dA = vd under I4.W h e nI5 or I6 holds, the domestic ﬁrm keeps its assets.
When I2 holds, there exist multiple equilibria.21
Lemma 1 has some noteworthy implications. For instance, Caves (1996) argues that
the acquisition price will be high, due to equity share holder competition, which implies
that the MNE must at least pay the maximum value of the ﬁrm in the hands of local
management, i.e. vd. Lemma 1 shows that the acquisition price will be the maximum
of vmm and vd, since not only shareholders but also other MNEs compete to acquire the
assets.
Moreover, the main motivations for MNEs to acquire the domestic ﬁrm’s assets is
that ownership of these assets allows an early entry into the market or give access to
proprietary assets. Increasing the strategic value of the domestic assets, increasing α, will
increase the proﬁt in the product market for the acquirer, relative to greenﬁeld MNEs.
This makes the bidding competition between the MNEs tougher and drives up the MNEs’
valuations of the domestic assets. This, in turn, will lead to a foreign acquisition of the
domestic assets, as shown by the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. Given that the strategic value of the domestic assets is suﬃciently
high, α > α∗, the equilibrium asset ownership structure is km.
Proof. See the Appendix.
However, while high strategic value is conducive to foreign acquisitions, high strategic
value is not necessarily associated with high proﬁtability as shown in the next section.
3.1. Proﬁtability and the strategic value of the domestic assets
When bargaining between an MNE and a domestic seller takes place in isolation, acqui-
sition entry should become more proﬁtable as compared to greenﬁeld entry, the more
strategically valuable the domestic assets are. The reason being that both parties gain
when the total surplus increases in most bargaining models. However, when there are
21 An equilibrium where ﬁrm d keeps the assets and no MNE posts a bid above vd. There is
also an equilibrium where one of the MNEs obtains the assets at a price vmm − ε and another
MNE posts the second highest bid at vmm − 2ε.
14several potential buyers of the domestic ﬁrm’s assets, the net proﬁts of the acquirer may
decrease as illustrated by the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. When several MNEs are potential buyers of the domestic ﬁrm’s assets,
the net proﬁts of all types of MNEs, including the acquirer, may decrease, the more
strategically valuable the domestic assets are.
To explain this result, we explore how the net-proﬁt of the acquiring MNE, ΠA,
changes from an increase in parameter α when I1, I2 or I3 holds. In these cases, bidding
competition among the MNEs over the domestic ﬁrm’s assets is more intense, since the
value of preventing other MNEs from obtaining the domestic assets is high.
To proceed, let E[ΠNA] denote the expected proﬁt (omitting the asset-ownership
vector km as an argument), at the beginning of period 2 for an MNE not acquiring the
domestic ﬁrm’s assets. The net proﬁt of the acquiring MNE can then be written:
ΠA = πA(k
m) − A (3.1)
= πA(k
m) − [πA(k




m) − G] (3.3)
First, note that any increase in proﬁt due to an increased strategic value of the
domestic assets ¯ k for the buyer is oﬀ-set. The reason is that the price of the assets is
determined by a non-acquiring MNE’s willingness to pay, which, in turn, is determined
b yt h et w ot e r m si nt h eb r a c k e t e de x p r e s s i o ni n( 3 . 2 ) . T h eﬁrst term is the proﬁtf o r
the non-acquiring MNE, if this ﬁrm were to obtain ¯ k. This will increase to exactly the
same extent as the acquirer’s proﬁt and will thus oﬀ-set the acquirer’s proﬁti n c r e a s e .
H e n c e ,t h ec h a n g ei nn e tp r o ﬁt for the acquirer from a change in strategic value of the
domestic assets is then completely determined by the change in proﬁt of the non-acquirer
when not buying. This proﬁt, E[ΠNA], is the second term in the bracketed expression
in (3.2), and is written out in (3.3). If E[ΠNA] decreases (increases) due to increase in
15the strategic value of the domestic assets, the net proﬁto ft h ea c q u i r e r ,ΠA, will then
decrease (increase). Three eﬀects will determine how this proﬁt changes when α changes.
3.1.1. Strategic value and product market eﬀects
Let us ﬁrst assume that the risk of failure in greenﬁeld investment does not depend on
α. This would correspond to case (i) version of the greenﬁeld game in Section 2.2 or to
the situation where the change in α is so small that the number of greenﬁeld entrants
is not aﬀected in version (ii). We can then treat the probability of successful greenﬁeld
entry, Pm, as exogenous. It then follows that there is a product-market eﬀect on the
non-acquirer’s proﬁt from an increase in strategic value. This product-market eﬀect








w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dE[ΠNA] ≡ Pm[πG(km) − G] from (3.3) and
∂πG(km)
∂α < 0 by Assump-
tion A3.
Any beneﬁts from acquiring the domestic ﬁrm’s assets are competed away in the
bidding competition among potential buyers. The only thing left is any negative exter-
nalities on rivals the acquired assets might generate, and these become stronger the more
strategically valuable the domestic assets are.
3.1.2. Strategic value and entry eﬀects
If the number of greenﬁeld entrants Nm is aﬀected by a change in α,t h e r ea r et w o
additional eﬀects: The investment game value eﬀect and the entry possibility eﬀect.
Rewriting (3.3) into E[ΠNA]=P mΠG a n dt a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a tt h e r ei st h e na










The investment game value eﬀect, represented by the ﬁrst term in (3.5), shows how
the proﬁt of participating in the entry game is aﬀected when the number of successful
entrants changes. The entry possibility eﬀect, as represented by the second term in
(3.5), shows how the expected proﬁt changes with the changed probability of successful
greenﬁeld entry. It follows from Assumption 3 that the stronger the acquiring MNE
becomes in the product market competition, the less proﬁtable is greenﬁeld entry. The
investment game value eﬀect is then positive since from Assumption A1, the aggregate
proﬁt in the investment game increases when product market competition is weakened,
due to a lower number of greenﬁeld entrants. On the other hand, the entry possibility
eﬀect will be negative. The reason is that greenﬁeld entry is less likely since the acquirer
now being a stronger competitor.
In summary, if the probability of successful greenﬁeld entry Pm is exogenous, the
net proﬁts of all types of MNEs, including the acquirer, decrease the more strategically
valuable the domestic assets are.23 The reason is that any beneﬁts from acquiring the
domestic ﬁrm’s assets are competed away in the bidding competition among potential
buyers. The only thing left is any negative externalities on rivals the acquired assets
might generate, and these become stronger the more strategically valuable the domestic
assets become. When the probability of successful greenﬁeld entry Pm depends on α,w e
also need to take the two entry eﬀects into account. It then follows that the net proﬁts
could increase as well as decrease when the domestic assets become more strategically
valuable. This is also illustrated in a linear Cournot model in Appendix A.6 (see, ﬁgure
A.1).
22We write net proﬁts directly as a function of the number of greenﬁeld entrants, Π(N). ∆Nm is the
change in the number of greenﬁeld entrants and, from (2.3), ∆Pm = ∆Nm
M−1 is the corresponding change
in the probability of greenﬁeld entry.
23Note that the acquirer beneﬁts if I4 holds, since an increase in α then implies that the acquirer’s
proﬁt increases and the acquisition price is unaﬀected, since A = πd(kd).
173.2. Proﬁtability and limited greenﬁeld possibilities
An MNE not entering by M&A faces the risk of not being able to successfully locate
production in the market. We have provided two reasons why this might be the case: (i)
Greenﬁeld entry might be risky due to the lack of knowledge of the speciﬁc characteristics
of the local market.24 (ii) There may be several MNEs competing to enter the market,
all of which may not be able to make proﬁtable entry.
L e tu sn o wc o m p a r et h en e tp r o ﬁts for the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms, given that the
domestic assets are sold, i.e. I1, I2, I3 or I4 holds. We then have the following result:
Proposition 3. An MNE successfully entering greenﬁeld makes at least as high a net
proﬁt as an MNE entering by acquisition.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equilibrium acquisitions should be proﬁtable relative to greenﬁeld entry when bar-
gaining between the acquiring MNE and the seller takes place in isolation, since the
buying MNE would otherwise enter greenﬁeld. But when there are several potential
buyers for the domestic ﬁrm, the price of the domestic ﬁrm’s assets will be determined
such that the non-acquirer (and the acquirer) is indiﬀerent between acquiring and not
acquiring.25 Consequently, the expected proﬁt from entry by acquisition should equal
the expected proﬁt from greenﬁeld entry. However, when there is a risk associated with
greenﬁeld entry, the ex post proﬁt for the acquirer will be lower than the ex post proﬁt
for the successful greenﬁeld entrant.
24One other possible interpretation of this situation is that each ﬁrm invests a ﬁxed cost F when
participating in the investment game, for instance lobbying or marketing costs. Firms are then randomly
drawn as successful over time. A ﬁrm drawn as successful would then enter iﬀ proﬁtable according to
the entry conditions in the model. πG(kl) w o u l dt h e nc o r r e s p o n dt ot h ep r o ﬁt for a successful entrant
and πE(kl) to the proﬁt for an unsuccessful entrant. This implies that we can use our set-up as long as
the expected proﬁt for a greenﬁeld entrant is still non-negative.
25This is true under I1-I3, under I4 the expected proﬁt for the acquirer is lower than the expected
proﬁtf o rt h en o n - a c q u i r e r .
183.3. Stockmarket value and cross-border acquisitions
In this section, we will make a couple of remarks on the implications for stock market
value. Following the standard approach in the so-called event studies on M&A perfor-
mance, we assume that the acquisition comes as a surprise for the ﬁnancial markets.26 We
then show in table 3.2 how the ﬁrms’ stock market values are aﬀected by the acquisition.
Table 3.2: Change in stockmarket value.
Domestic ﬁrm: Acquirer:
In relation to pre-
merger announce-
ment value:








I1, I2: + − 0 −
I3: + +0 −
I4: + + −−
Note : A formal proof is provided in Appendix A.5. Figures A2 and A3 provide an illustration for the
results in the second column for a linear Cournot model .
The ﬁrst column compares the stock market value of the target at the time of the
announcement of the acquisition to its pre-merger announcement value. The bidding
competition implies that the domestic ﬁrm will sell its assets at a higher price than its
pre-merger value vd = πd(kd). Moreover, under I1, I2 or I3, the acquisition price is
possibly substantiality higher since A = vmm >v d. Hence, the target ﬁrm’s share price
increases when the acquisition is announced.27
26Fridolfsson and Stennek (1999) argue that the stockmarket, if being eﬃcient, should anticipate the
merger, and the new information in the merger announcement is which ﬁrms are insiders and which
are outsiders. Under this assumption they show that preemptive mergers could explain the empirical
evidence that mergers reduce proﬁts and raise share prices. The reason is that the proﬁt decreases less
for insiders than for outsiders.
27This seems consistent with empirical results from event studies on merger performance. The event
studies investigate how the stock market values the merger when it is announced by comparing share
19The eﬀect on the acquirer is more involved, and depends on the reference point. In
the second column, we compare the net-proﬁts of the acquiring ﬁrm, ΠA(km),w i t hi t s





=P d  
πG(kd) − G
 
. Under I3 or I4,a na c q u i s i t i o n
leads to an increase in net proﬁts, and, consequently, to an increase in stock market
value. However, more surprisingly, under I1 or I2, an acquisition lowers the net proﬁt
of the acquirer and reduces the stock market value of this ﬁrm. Recall from section
3.1 that a high strategic value of the domestic assets generates a high acquisition price,
since the acquirer makes a high product market proﬁt, while the product market proﬁt
as a non-acquirer is low. When I1 or I2 holds, the latter eﬀe c ti ss os t r o n gt h a tt h e
acquiring ﬁrm faces a lower net-proﬁt as compared to a situation when no acquisition
takes place.28
In column three, we compare the stock-market value of the acquirer to that of a
non-acquirer.29 Since the bidding competition makes MNEs indiﬀerent between buying
and not buying, the stock market value of the acquirer relative to a non-acquirer remains
unchanged when the acquisition is announced. Hence, while the acquirer’s stock market
value may be reduced as a consequence of the acquisition, participating in the bidding
competition is nevertheless consistent with proﬁt maximization.30
Finally, we compare the acquirer’s proﬁtt oag r e e n ﬁeld entrant at the time when the
greenﬁeld uncertainty is resolved. From section 3.2, we have seen that when there is a
risk associated with greenﬁeld entry, the ex post proﬁt for the acquirer, ΠA(km), will be
lower than the ex post proﬁt for the successful greenﬁeld entrant, ΠG(km).H e n c e ,t h e
prices a few weeks before and after the event. The results from these studies are that the target ﬁrms’
shareholders beneﬁt, and the buying ﬁrms’ shareholders break even. See Scherer and Ross (1990) and
its references to empirical studies on M&A performance.
28In appendix A.6, we illustrate these results using a linear Cournot model (see, ﬁgures A.2 and A.3).
29We then compare the net-proﬁts of the acquiring ﬁrm, ΠA(km), with the expected net-proﬁts of the
non-acquirer, E[ΠNA]=E[ ΠG(km) ]=P m [πG(km) − G].
30Note also that under I4,a l lM N E sb e n e ﬁt from an acquisition. The acquirer bears the costs of
the acquisition, however. Therefore, the acquirer’s stock market value is reduced in relation to a non-
acquirer.
20stock market value of the acquirer relative to a greenﬁeld entrant decrease.
We can summarize:
Corollary 1. T h es t oc km a r k e tv a l u eo ft h ed o m e s t i cﬁrm increases when the acquisition
is announced. The stock market value of the acquirer may increase or decrease.
4. Concluding discussion
In this paper, it has been shown that the bidding competition over the domestic target
ﬁrm implies that there are no excess proﬁts to be made in cross-border acquisitions
when bidding ﬁrms are symmetric. We have also shown that this bidding competition
implies that the domestic ﬁrm will sell its assets at a higher, and possibly substantiality
higher, price than its reservation price. The empirical implication is then that the target
ﬁrm’s shareholders beneﬁt from the acquisition, which seems consistent with the existing
empirical literature. The predictions for the acquirer are more involved. However, an
interesting ﬁnding is that the share value of both the buyer and the non-buyer will
decrease when a merger is announced if the domestic assets are suﬃciently strategically
important. This is due to the fact that the bidding competition is then so ﬁerce that the
ﬁrms involved would be better oﬀ not starting a bidding war.31
If there is a risk associated with greenﬁeld entry our empirical prediction is that, in
the long run, when the greenﬁeld uncertainty is resolved, the share value of a successful
greenﬁeld entrant should perform better than the share value of the acquirer. To test this
hypothesis, we would need to be able to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful
non-acquirers. One possibility would be to use data from markets opened up by an
investment liberalization. It should then be possible to identify the MNEs active in
the industry: acquiring ﬁrms, greenﬁeld entrants, exporters and ﬁrms not active in the
market.
31However, if ﬁrms are asymmetric, a cross-border acquisition should lead to higher share prices
and proﬁt streams for the acquirer, compared to its rival ﬁrms not involved in acquisitions, since the
acquiring ﬁrm will then pay a lower price than its valuation of the ﬁr m ,t h e r e b yl e a d i n gt oas u r p l u sf o r
the acquirer.
21One potential problem with testing the results from this model is that MNEs are
typical multi-product ﬁrms that only derive a small fraction of their revenues from the
market where the acquisition takes place. Using proﬁt ﬂows in aﬃliates might be a way
of handling this problem.
The main results in the paper would also hold if the acquisition and greenﬁeld de-
cisions were assumed to take place simultaneously. To see this, note that as long as
the domestic assets are scarce and their use by an MNE shifts proﬁts from greenﬁeld
investors to the acquiring MNE, vmm might be higher than vmd and vd and Proposition
3.5 is then valid. Moreover, Proposition 3 would also hold since acquisition entry is still
certain and greenﬁeld entry uncertain and equation 3.3 applies.
A critical assumption in this paper is that the only risk is a ﬁrm-speciﬁcr i s ko f
unsuccessful greenﬁeld entry. However, in a more general set-up, there might also be a
risk associated with entry by acquisition and a market risk. If the latter risks are low
enough, relative to the risk of greenﬁeld entry, the results in the paper should still hold.
A. Appendix:
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
A.1.1. Solving for the equilibrium buyer
First, note that bi ≥ maxvml,l= {d,m} is a weakly dominated strategy, since no MNE
will post a bid equal or above its maximum valuation of obtaining the assets and that
ﬁrm d will accept a bid in stage 2, iﬀ bi >v d.
Inequality I1: Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗ =( b∗
1,b ∗
2,...,yes). Let us assume
that MNE w  = d is the MNE that has posted the highest bid and obtains the assets and
ﬁrm s  = d is the MNE with the second highest bid.
Then, b∗
w ≥ vmm is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v mm −ε is not an equilibrium
since ﬁrm j  = w,d then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will then obtain
22the assets and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vmm − ε,
and b∗
s ∈ [vmm −ε,v mm −2ε], then no MNE has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to
no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases, since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vd.
Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no incentive to deviate. Thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,,,b m,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Let MNE h be the MNE with the
highest bid. Firm d will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vd.B u tM N Ej  = d will have the incentive
to deviate to b  = vd + ε in period 1, since vmd >v d. This contradicts the assumption
that b is a Nash equilibrium.




is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v ij−ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm j  = w,d then
beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w+ε, since it will then obtain the assets and pay a price
lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vmm−ε,a n db∗
s ∈ [vmm−ε,v mm−2ε],
then no MNE has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases
since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation, vd. Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no
incentive to deviate. Thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗∗ =( b∗∗
1 ,b ∗∗
2 ,...,no). Then, b∗
w ≥ vmd is not an
equilibrium since ﬁrm d would then beneﬁt by deviating to yes.I fb∗
w ≤ vd then no MNE
has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to yes, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases since it then
sells its assets at a price below its valuation, vd.F i r m d has no incentive to deviate.
Thus, b∗∗ is a Nash equilibrium.




vmm is a weakly dominated strategy. b∗
w <v mm − ε is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm
j  = w,d then beneﬁts from deviating to bj = b∗
w + ε, since it will then obtain the assets
and pay a price lower than its valuation of obtaining them. If b∗
w = vmm − ε,a n d
b∗
s ∈ [vmm − ε,v mm − 2ε], then no MNE has an incentive to deviate. By deviating to
no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ decreases since it foregoes a selling price exceeding its valuation vd.
Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no incentive to deviate. Thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
23Let b =( b1,...,b M,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm d will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vd.
But MNE j  = d will then have the incentive to deviate to b  = vd + ε in stage 1 since,
vmd >v d. This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm w w o u l dt h e nb e n e ﬁtb yd e v i a t i n gt obw = vd. b∗
w <v d
is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm d w o u l dt h e nn o ta c c e p ta n yb i d .I fb∗
w = vd,t h e nﬁrm
w has no incentive to deviate. By deviating to b 
j ≤ b∗
w, ﬁrm j’s, j  = w,d,p a y o ﬀ does
not change. By deviating to b 
j >b ∗
w, ﬁrm j’s payoﬀ decreases since it has to pay a price
above its willingness to pay vmm. Accordingly, ﬁrm j has no incentive to deviate. By
deviating to no, ﬁrm d’s payoﬀ does not change. Accordingly, ﬁrm d has no incentive to
deviate. Thus, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let b =( b1,...,bm,no) be a Nash equilibrium. Firm d will then say no iﬀ bh ≤ vd.
But MNE j  = d will have the incentive to deviate to b  = vd+ε in stage 1 since, vmd >v d.
This contradicts the assumption that b is a Nash equilibrium.




i <v d ∀i ∈ M. It then follows directly that no ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. Thus,
b∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Then note that ﬁrm d will accept a bid iﬀ bi ≥ vd. But bi ≥ vd is a weakly dominated
bid in these intervals, since vd > max{vmm,v md}. Thus, the assets will not be sold in
these intervals.
A.2. Proofs concerning table 3.1
Inequalities I1,I2 or I3: Note that ΠA is derived as follows. First, note that A =















A.3. Proof of proposition 1
We need to show that for a suﬃciently high value of the complimentarity α, the equi-
librium market structure is always km. Note that the equilibrium market structure kd
arises under inequalities I5 and I6. Inspecting these inequalities reveals that they have
in common that vmd <v d.N o t e t h a t vd = πd(kd) is not dependent on α. Moreover,
note that vmd = πA(km) − Pd  
πG(kd) − G
 
. From Assumption 1, the ﬁrst term in this





dα =0 . Hence, there exists a α∗ such that for any α > α∗, vmd >v d and,
consequently, the equilibrium market structure is km.
A.4. Proof of proposition 3
Inequalities I1,I2 or I3: Using table 3.1, we have:
ΠG − ΠA =[ πG(k




m) − G][1− P
m] > 0.
Inequality I4: First, note that from I4 in table 2.2, vd >v mm. Using (2.4) and (2.6),
we can write:






25Using (A.1) and table 3.1, we can now show that ΠG > ΠA, since:
ΠG > ΠA
πG(k








m) − G][1− P
m] > 0
A.5. Proof of Corollary 1 and table 3.2
Column one in table 3.2 follows directly from the fact that A > πd(kd) if an acquisition
takes place.
For the results in column two in table 3.2, denote the expected proﬁta nM N Ee n t e r -
ing greenﬁeld under MNE ownership of the domestic assets ¯ k as E [ΠG(km)]. Likewise,
denote the expected proﬁta nM N Ee n t e r i n gg r e e n ﬁeld under domestic ownership of




. Under I1 and I2,w eh a v evmm >v md.U s i n g









.U n d e rI3,w eh a v evmm <v md. Using (2.4) and (2.5), this can


















= vmd − vd > 0.
For the results in column three in table 3.2, note that under I1, I2 and I3,w eh a v e
ΠA(km)=E [ΠG(km)]. Under I4, using (2.4) and (2.6), we have ΠA(km)−E [ΠG(km)] =
vmm − vd < 0.
Finally, column four in table 3.2 follows directly from the proof of proposition 3.
A.6. The Linear Cournot model
For illustration and as proof for some of the some results, we use a linear Cournot model.
Suppose that demand is linear P = a − Q,w h e r eQ is total quantity. Moreover,
26suppose that the marginal cost for a ﬁrm of type h takes the form:32
ch =

   
   
cA = c − α¯ k
cG = c − kG
cd = c − ¯ k
, (A.2)
Due to linear demand, it follows that the product market proﬁts of the ﬁrms will be
quadratic functions of their optimal quantity choices, i.e. πh = q2
h.A s s u m i n g t h a t
marginal costs and ﬁrm quantities are always positive (i.e. ch > 0 and qh > 0 holds), the
proﬁt of the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms as a function of the ownership structure are given in
table A.1, below.
Table A.1: Proﬁts for the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms in the linear Cournot model.






















A.6.1. Proof of proposition 3.5
Assume that M =5 ,G =0 .1, kG =1 .5, ¯ k =1 .4, Λ = a − c =6and G =3 .2.I nﬁgure
A.1, we then show how the net proﬁto ft h ea c q u i r e r ,ΠA, depends on the strategic value
of the domestic assets, α, when allowing for entry eﬀects. The ﬁgure ﬁrst illustrates that
a increase in strategic value decreases the net proﬁt of the acquirer for a given number
of greenﬁeld entrants. Moreover, if an increase in α reduces greenﬁeld entry, there is a
32We tried a wide range of parameter values and alternative speciﬁcations of both costs and demand
















Figure A.1: Net proﬁt of the acquirer and greenﬁeld entry.
discrete increase in net proﬁts of the acquirer. However, when entry by greenﬁeld is not
possible, all monopoly rents are competed away.
A.6.2. Illustrating Corollary 1:
Assume that M =5 ,G =0 .1, kG =1 .5, Λ = a − c =6and G =0 ,1. For simplicity,
u s i n gal o wc o s to fg r e e n ﬁeld entry then implies that the probability of greenﬁeld entry
Ph is set to unity. In ﬁgA . 2 ,w eﬁrst illustrate the implied Equilibrium Ownership
Structure (EOS) over the α ¯ k -space. This ﬁgure illustrates proposition 1 as α must be
suﬃciently high for an acquisition to occur (i.e. α > 1). In ﬁgure A.3, we calculate the
implied change in stockmarket value for the acquirer as compared to a situation where no
acquisition takes place. The change in stockmarket value is then measured the diﬀerence
between net-proﬁts of the acquiring MNE, ΠA(km), and its pre-merger announcement




= ΠA(km) − Pd  
πG(kd) − G
 
.T h i s ﬁgure illustrates
the statement in corollary 1 that the stockmarket value of the acquirer may decrease (at
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Figure A.3: Change in stockmarket value for the acquirer.
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